To begin with, Aquinas specifically denies that the ultimate end of man could consist in morally good action. This early treatment of natural law is saturated with the notion of end. Moreover, it is no solution to argue that one can derive the ought of moral judgment from the is of ethical evaluation: This act is virtuous; therefore, it ought to be done. Not even Hume could object to such a deduction. [65] The point has been much debated despite the clarity of Aquinass position that natural law principles are self-evident; Stevens, op. In one he explains that for practical reason, as for theoretical reason, it is true that false judgments occur. That candle is a single act of goodness, an act of virtue, a freely chosen act that brings into the world a good that was not there before. In his response he does not exclude virtuous acts which are beyond the call of duty. This point is merely lexicographical, yet it has caused some confusionfor instance, concerning the relationship between natural law and the law of nations, for sometimes Aquinas contradistinguishes the two while sometimes he includes the law of nations in natural law. Being is the basic intelligibility; it represents our first discovery about anything we are to knowthat it is, To say that all other principles are based on this principle does not mean that all other principles are derived from it by deduction. Rather, it is primarily a principle of actions. Although Bourke is right in noticing that Nielsens difficulties partly arise from his positivism, I think Bourke is mistaken in supposing that a more adequate metaphysics could bridge the gap between theory and practice. Experience can be understood and truth can be known about the things of experience, but understanding and truth attain a dimension of reality that is not actually contained within experience, although experience touches the surface of the same reality. B. Schuster, S.J., Von den ethischen Prinzipien: Eine Thomasstudie zu S. The first precept does not say what we ought to do in contradistinction to what we will do. His response is that since precepts oblige, they are concerned with duties, and duties derive from the requirements of an end. Moreover, because the end proposed by the utilitarians is only a psychic state and because utilitarians also hold a mechanistic theory of causality, utilitarianism denies that any kind of action is intrinsically good or bad. 94, a. [82] Gerard Smith, S.J., & Lottie H. Kendzierski, The Philosophy of Beino: Metaphysics (New York, 1961), 1: 28, make the most of such dialectic in order to show the transcendence of being over essence. Maritain points out that Aquinas uses the word quasi in referring to the prescriptive conclusions derived from common practical principles. 1, lect. In neither aspect is the end fundamental. Most people were silent. Act according to the precepts of the state, and never against. Joseph Buckley, S.M., Mans Last End (St. Louis and London, 1950), 164210, shows that there is no natural determinate last end for man. For Aquinas, practical reason not only has a peculiar subject matter, but it is related to its subject matter in a peculiar way, for practical reason introduces the order it knows, while theoretical reason adopts the order it finds. However, the direction of action by reason, which this principle enjoins, is not the sole human good. The important point to grasp from all this is that when Aquinas speaks of self-evident principles of natural law, he does not mean tautologies derived by mere conceptual analysisfor example: Stealing is wrong, where stealing means the unjust taking of anothers property. cit. 1-2, q. Rather, it regulates action precisely by applying the principles of natural law. Of course, I must disagree with Nielsens position that decision makes discourse practical. 94, a. The precepts of reason which clothe the objects of inclinations in the intelligibility of ends-to-be-pursued-by-workthese precepts are the natural law. at II.6. Precisely the point at issue is this, that from the agreement of actions with human nature or with a decree of the divine will, one cannot derive the prescriptive sentence: They ought to be done.. d. Act according to the precepts of the state, and never against. This interpretation simply ignores the important role we have seen Aquinas assign the inclinations in the formation of natural law. For practical reason, to know is to prescribe. 67; Super Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, bk. It is necessary for the active principle to be oriented toward that something or other, whatever it is, if it is going to be brought about. but the previous terminology seems to be carefully avoided, and . The first principle, expressed here in the formula, To affirm and simultaneously to deny is excluded, is the one sometimes called the principle of contradiction and sometimes called the principle of noncontradiction: The same cannot both be and not be at the same time and in the same respect. It is not equivalent, for example, to self-preservation, and it is as much a mistake to identify one particular precept as another with the first principle of practical reason. 1-2, q. Indeed, the addition of will to theoretical knowledge cannot make it practical. In this part of the argument, Nielsen clearly recognizes the distinction between theoretical and practical reason on which I have been insisting. p. but the question was not a commonplace. Maritain recognizes that is to be cannot be derived from the meaning of good by analysis. If the mind is to work toward unity with what it knows by conforming the known to itself rather than by conforming itself to the known, then the mind must think the known under the intelligibility of the good, for it is only as an object of tendency and as a possible object of action that what is to be through practical reason has any reality at all. These. 1, a. p. 108, lines 1727. The intelligibility of good is: Until the object of practical reason is realized, it exists only in reason and in the action toward it that reason directs. But over and above this objection, he insists that normative discourse, insofar as it is practical, simply cannot be derived from a mere consideration of facts. [27] Hence in this early work he is saying that the natural law is precisely the ends to which man is naturally inclined insofar as these ends are present in reason as principles for the rational direction of action. An object of consideration ordinarily belongs to the world of experience, and all the aspects of our knowledge of that object are grounded in that experience. It also is a mistake to suppose that the primary principle is equivalent to the precept, Reason should be followed, as Lottin seems to suggest. examines how Aquinas relates reason and freedom. They ignore the peculiar character of practical truth and they employ an inadequate notion of self-evidence. Of course, so far as grammar alone is concerned, the gerundive form can be employed to express an imperative. In the first paragraph Aquinas restates the analogy between precepts of natural law and first principles of theoretical reason. Thus we see that final causality underlies Aquinass conception of what law is. When I think that there should be more work done on the foundations of specific theories of natural law, such a judgment is practical knowledge, for the mind requires that the situation it is considering change to fit its demands rather than the other way about. But Aquinas does not describe natural law as eternal law passively received in man; he describes it rather as a participation in the eternal law. Desires are to be fulfilled, and pain is to be avoided. Three arguments are set out for the position that natural law contains only one precept, and a single opposing argument is given to show that it contains many precepts. Naturalism frequently has explained away evildoing, just as some psychological and sociological theories based on determinism now do. at II.7.2. We may imagine an intelligibility as an intellect-sized bite of reality, a bite not necessarily completely digested by the mind. The insane sometimes commit violations of both principles within otherwise rational contexts, but erroneous judgment and wrong decision need not always conflict with first principles. Using the primary principle, reason reflects on experience in which the natural inclinations are found pointing to goods appropriate to themselves. (Ditchling, 1930), 103155. Aquinas on Content of Natural Law ST I-II, Q.94, A.2 This point is of the greatest importance in Aquinass treatise on the end of man. [83] That the basic precepts of practical reason lead to the natural acts of the will is clear: Super Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, bk. Suarez offers a number of formulations of the first principle of the natural law. Aquinas mentions this point in at least two places. The natural law is a participation in the wisdom and goodness of God by the human person, formed in the image of the Creator. To be definite is a condition of being anything, and this condition is fulfilled by whatever a thing happens to be. Among his formulations are: That which is to be done is to be done, and: The good is an end worth pursuing.. Before intelligence enters, man acts by sense spontaneity and learns by sense experience. One of these is that differences between practical judgments must have an intelligible basisthe requirement that provides the principle for the generalization argument and for Kantian ethics. Thus natural law has many precepts which are unified in this, that all of these precepts are ordered to practical reasons achievement of its own end, the direction of action toward end. But more important for our present purpose is that this distinction indicates that the good which is to be done and pursued should not be thought of as exclusively the good of moral action. To recognize this distinction is not to deny that law can be expressed in imperative form. But it can direct only toward that for which man can be brought to act, and that is either toward the objects of his natural inclinations or toward objectives that derive from these. But it is central throughout the whole treatise. [5] That law pertains to reason is a matter of definition for Aquinas; law is an ordinance of reason, according to the famous definition of q. This view implies that human action ultimately is irrational, and it is at odds with the distinction between theoretical and practical reason. Just as the principle of contradiction expresses the definiteness which is the first condition of the objectivity of things and the consistency which is the first condition of theoretical reasons conformity to reality, so the first principle of practical reason expresses the imposition of tendency, which is the first condition of reasons objectification of itself, and directedness or intentionality, which is the first condition for conformity to mind on the part of works and ends. Questions 95 to 97 are concerned with man-made law. [15] On ratio see Andre Haven, S.J., LIntentionnel selon Saint Thomas (2nd ed., Bruges, Bruxelles, Paris, 1954), 175194. Good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided. It subsumes actions under this imperative, which limits the meaning of good to the good of action. There his formulation of the principle is specifically moralistic: The upright is to be done and the wrong avoided. Practical reason naturally understands these precepts to be human goods. Something similar holds with regard to the first practical principle. Our minds use the data of experience as a bridge to cross into reality in order to grasp the more-than-given truth of things. 2, c. The translation is my own; the paragraphing is added. [77] Sertillanges, op. In the sixth paragraph Aquinas explains how practical reason forms the basic principles of its direction. Reason does not regulate action by itself, as if the mere ability to reason were a norm. The Summa theologiae famously champions the principle that "good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided." There is another principle, however, to which, according to Dougherty, "Aquinas gives the most analysis throughout his writings," namely, the principle that "the commandments of God are to be obeyed" (147-148). This point is merely lexicographical, yet it has caused some confusionfor instance, concerning the relationship between natural law and the law of nations, for sometimes Aquinas contradistinguishes the two while sometimes he includes the law of nations in natural law. In the treatise on the Old Law, for example, Aquinas takes up the question whether this law contains only a single precept. What the intellect perceives to be good is what the will decides to do. Romans 16:17. Still, if good denoted only moral goods, either wrong practical judgments could in no way issue from practical reason or the formula we are examining would not in reality express the first principle of practical reason. What difference would it make if these principles were viewed as so many conclusions derived from the conjunction of the premises The human good is to be sought and Such and such an action will promote the human goodpremises not objectionable on the ground that they lead to the derivation of imperatives that was criticized above? To recognize this distinction is not to deny that law can be expressed in imperative form. 6. cit. It directs that good is to be done and pursued, and it allows no alternative within the field of action. 94, a. 95, a. Being is the basic intelligibility; it represents our first discovery about anything we are to knowthat it is something to be known. [17] Rather, this principle is basic in that it is given to us by our most primitive understanding. It also is a mistake to suppose that the primary principle is equivalent to the precept. supra note 50, at 109. There should be a fine line between what is good or evil, one that is not solely dependent on what an individual thinks is good or bad. The fact that the mind cannot but form the primary precept and cannot think practically except in accordance with it does not mean that the precept exercises its control covertly. Not all outcomes are ones we want or enjoy. Now since any object of practical reason first must be understood as an object of tendency, practical reasons first step in effecting conformity with itself is to direct the doing of works in pursuit of an end. One is to suppose that it means anthropomorphism, a view at home both in the primitive mind and in idealistic metaphysics. Of course, I must disagree with Nielsens position that decision makes discourse practical. 1819. 1-2, q. One whose practical premise is, Pleasure is to be pursued, might reach the conclusion, Adultery ought to be avoided, without this prohibition becoming a principle of his action. Even so accurate a commentator as Stevens introduces the inclination of the will as a ground for the prescriptive force of the first principle. Even for purely theoretical knowledge, to know is a fulfillment reached by a development through which one comes to share in a spiritual way the characteristics and reality of the world which is known. This illation is intelligible to anyone except a positivist, but it is of no help in explaining the origin of moral judgments. These tendencies are not natural law; the tendencies indicate possible actions, and hence they provide reason with the point of departure it requires in order to propose ends. 94, a. This participation is necessary precisely insofar as man shares the grand office of providence in directing his own life and that of his fellows. My main purpose is not to contribute to the history of natural law, but to clarify Aquinass idea of it for current thinking. 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